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data is that the divergence across countries responds to quantitatively important differences 
along the employment rate (the extensive margin). In this paper we develop an equilibrium 
matching model where both margins are endogenous. The model is rich enough to account 
for the behavior of the two margins of the aggregate hours when we include the observed 
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unemployment benefits and the bargaining power. Because these findings come from an 
unified framework, they also give a strong support to the matching models. 
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Introduction
Aggregate hours of market work exhibit dramatic di®erences across industrialized countries.
What accounts for these di®erences? In the current literature, there are two candidate
approaches allowing to explain these di®erences.
2A ¯rst set of contributions focus on the decline of the average hours worked per employee
(the intensive margin) in European countries since 1960. Prescott (2004) studies the role
of taxes in accounting for di®erences in labor supply across time and across countries. He
¯nds that the e®ective marginal tax rate on labor income explains most of the di®erences at
points of time and the large change in relative (to US) labor supply over time. On this line of
research, Rogerson (2006) shows that the aggregate hours worked in Continental European
countries such as Belgium, France, Germany and Italy are roughly one third less than in the
US. This fact results from a diverging process in the hours worked per employee in each zone:
between 1960 and 1980, whereas in Europe we observe a large decrease, in the US this decline
is very small; and after 1980, we observe in the two zones a stable number of hours worked
per employee. This evolution of the hours worked per employee is strongly correlated to
the dynamics of the taxes. Hence, as it is suggested by Prescott (2004), Rogerson (2006) or
Ohanian, Ra®o, and Rogerson (2006), a theory providing a link between the hours worked
per employee and taxes seems to be su±cient to explain why Europeans work less than
Americans.
However, since 1980 a notable feature of the data is that di®erences across countries in
aggregate hours are due to quantitatively important di®erences along the extensive margin.
Hence, a second set of contributions (see e.g. Layard and Nickell (1991), Mortensen and
Pissarides (1999), Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) or Ljungqvist and Sargent (2007)) considers
that the large decrease of the employment rate observed after 1980 in the European countries,
is an important factor of the dynamics of total hours. These works show that di®erent
labor market institutions lead to di®erent labor market outcomes after a common shock.
In these previous papers, there is fairly robust evidence that (i) the level and duration of
unemployment bene¯ts and (ii) the union's bargaining power have a signi¯cant positive
impact on unemployment1
To sum up, the main factors explaining the decline in the hours worked per employee
di®er from those explaining the decline in the employment rate: the taxes for the former,
and the labor market institutions, such as the unions' power or the unemployment bene¯ts,
for the second. Clearly, all together contribute to the dynamics of the two margins of the
total hours.
From a theoretical point of view, the aim of this paper is to provide a theory allowing
to account for the impact, of both taxes and labor market institutions, on the two margins
1There is less consensus on the e®ects of the employment protection legislation. At the opposite, there is
some labor market institutions associated with lower unemployment: highly centralized and/or coordinated wage
bargaining systems, as well as some categories of public spending on active labor market programmes. See Daveri
and Tabellini (2000) or Bassanini and Duval (2006) who provide a review of recent literature on this topic.
3of the aggregate hours worked. To this end, we follow the empirical methodology presented
in Ohanian, Ra®o, and Rogerson (2006): the quantitative evaluation of the model and
the impact of distortions is based on the computation of series for the gap between the
marginal cost and the marginal return of labor that is produced using actual data and model
restrictions2. Furthermore, we extend the theoretical investigation: beyond the usual neo-
classical growth model which allows to predict the hours worked per employee, we explore
the ability of the Hansen (1985)-Rogerson (1988) model to reproduce the dynamics of the
employment rate. Finally, we develop a general equilibrium matching model, close to the
one proposed by Andolfatto (1996), Fµ eve and Langot (1996) and Ch¶ eron and Langot (2004),
allowing to explain the dynamics of both the hours worked per employee and the employment
rate. This last model is rich enough to allow the evaluation of the relative contribution of
the tax/bene¯t systems and unions in the explanation of the observed allocation of time.
Our sample consists of six countries: Belgium, Spain, France, Italy, United Kingdom and
the United States. Depending on the availability of data, the analysis covers the 1980-2003
or the 1960-2003 period. The main ¯ndings are the following. First, the long-run decline in
the hours worked per employee is mainly due to the increase of the taxes, as it is suggested
by Prescott (2004), Rogerson (2006) and Ohanian, Ra®o, and Rogerson (2006). Second,
the employment rate is a®ected by institutional aspects of the labor market, such as the
bargaining power and the unemployment bene¯ts, rather than by taxes, conversely to the
individual work e®ort. Finally, this behavior of the two margins of the aggregate hours is well
accounted by our search model, when it includes the observed heterogeneity of the tax/bene¯t
systems and the labor market indicators of the wage-setting process across countries. These
¯ndings give some support to the two explanations of the European decline in total hours:
the important role of taxes through the intensive margin and the large contribution of the
labor market institutions through the extensive margin. Because these ¯ndings come from
an uni¯ed framework, they also give a strong support to the matching models.
In the ¯rst section of the paper, we present some stylized facts concerning the total hours
worked, the contrasted dynamics of the hours worked per employee (the intensive margin)
and those relative to the employment rate (the extensive margin). The second section is
devoted to explore the implications of two walrasian growth models: in the ¯rst one only
the intensive margin is endogenous, whereas in the second one, only the extensive margin is
endogenous. This extension of the Ohanian, Ra®o, and Rogerson (2006)'s work clearly shows
that the increase in the divergence between theory and data is explained by two factors: the
taxes for the intensive margin, and the labor market institutions for the employment rate.
In the third section, we propose a model where both margins are endogenous. Moreover,
2The closer these gaps are to zero, the better the model accounts for the observed labor behavior.
4this framework, by introducing search and wage bargaining, allows to measure the relative
contribution of the labor market institutions and taxes. Last section gives the concluding
remarks.
1 Stylized Facts
In this part we establish some facts concerning the allocation of time in the countries of our
sample: Belgium, Spain, France, Italy, United Kingdom, United States3. To this goal, we
decompose the aggregate number of hours between the average hours worked per employee











where A denotes the active population (i.e. , employed plus unemployed), h the yearly
hours worked per employee and N the total civilian employment. As a ¯rst overview of
the labor behavior, we compute the sample mean of each variable in equation (1) over the
1960 to 2003 period (table 1). We observe notable di®erences in the total hours of work
(Nh=A). Moreover, countries with similar performances, measured by the aggregate hours,
show di®erent work e®orts (h) and employment rates (N=A). For instance, the average
total hours worked in Spain and France are very close to the total hours worked in the US.
However, while in France employees work as much as in the US, in Spain the individual work
e®ort is high enough to compensate its lower employment rate with respect to France and
the US.
Since the heterogeneity in the total number of hours worked is driven by the heterogeneity
of its components, we estimate their weight in the variance of the mean total hours (last line
of table 1). Results enhance the relevance of taking into account both margins: the hours
worked per employee and the employment rate have similar weights.
Next, we turn to the the evolution over time of the aggregate hours and its components,
displayed in ¯gures 1 to 3. To avoid scale problems, the total number of hours and the
individual e®ort are displayed on the left hand panel of each ¯gure, and the employment
rate on the right hand panel.
Aggregate hours. Most countries experience a sustained decrease in the aggregate hours
until the early 80s. The only exception is Spain, where the decline starts around 1970. It is
worth to notice that before 1975, the aggregate hours worked in the US are lower than in
the European countries.
3See appendix A for details on the data.




Belgium 1682 1806 0.928
Spain 1756 1958 0.892
France 1745 1861 0.933
Italy 1598 1738 0.917
United Kingdom 1921 2033 0.943
United States 1760 1868 0.941
Variance decomposition V [h] V [N=A] Cov(h;N=A)
0.50556 0.42814 0.066302
To avoid distortions associated to the dependence of the variance to the dimension of the variables, we
normalize the hours per employee h as follows: h
¤ =
h
hmax, where hmax = 14 ¤ 365; is the maximum
number of hours per year to be shared between work and leisure. See appendix A for details on the
data.
Figure 1: Belgium and Spain




































































6Figure 2: France and Italy




































































Figure 3: UK and US






















































7After 1982, the aggregate hours worked remain roughly stable in Belgium and Italy, and
still decreasing in France. Conversely, they increase in Spain, the UK, and the US. Finally,
even if the UK and the US display a similar evolution, the aggregate hours in the UK still
higher than in the US.
Hours per employee. The hours worked per employee exhibit a sustained decline along
the whole period in Belgium, France, Italy and the UK. In Spain, the decline starts around
1970. This decline is particularly sharp before 1980. By contrast, in the US the hours per
employee decrease until the early 80s and then levels o®. But it is still lower than in the UK.
Employment rate. Before 1985, all countries experience a steady decline in the em-
ployment rate of roughly 10%. Then there is virtually no trend in Belgium, Spain, France
and Italy. Whereas, in the US and the UK, the employment rate (in tendency) increases
ever since.
2 Walrasian growth model
In this section, we test the ability of two walrasian models to account for the long run
dynamics of the labor market in OECD countries. The ¯rst model focus on the dynamic of
the intensive margin (the number of hours worked per employee), whereas the second only
explain the dynamic of the extensive margin (the employment rate).
2.1 When only the intensive margin is endogenous
In this ¯rst section we propose to analyze the link between the hours worked per employee
and the labor market taxes. Similarly to Prescott (2004), Rogerson (2006) and Ohanian,
Ra®o, and Rogerson (2006), we use the traditional walrasian growth model where the hours
worked per employee are divisible: full-employment insures that the employment rate is
constat and that all the labor market adjustments are driven by the intensive margin.
2.1.1 Behaviors
The economy is populated by a large number of identical households whose measure is
normalized to one. Each household consists of a continuum of in¯nitely-lived agents. At




¯tU(Ct;1 ¡ ht) (2)
8where 0 < ¯ < 1 is the discount factor. Ct stands for per capita consumption and 1 ¡ ht
for the leisure time. The contemporaneous utility function is assumed to be increasing and
concave in both arguments and it shows conventional separability between consumption and
leisure:
U(Ct;1 ¡ ht) = lnCt + ¾ ln(1 ¡ ht) ¾ > 0
The capital stock Kt is rented to ¯rms at net price (rt+±), where 0 < ± < 1 is the depreciation
rate of capital. Each household chooses fCt;ht;Kt+1jt ¸ 0g to maximize (2) subject to the
budget constraint
(1 + Rt)Kt + (1 ¡ ¿w;t)wtht + Lt + ¼t ¡ Kt+1 ¡ (1 + ¿c;t)Ct ¸ 0 (¸t) (3)
where Rt = (1¡¿k)r is the e®ective interest rate, ¿k is the capital income tax rate, ¿c is the
consumption tax rate, ¿w the labor income tax rate, and b are the unemployment bene¯ts. L
is a lump-sum transfer from the government. We assume a balanced budget at each period.
w and ¼ are the real wage and lump-sum dividends remitted by ¯rms.
Each ¯rm has access to the Cobb-Douglas production technology to produce output.
Each producer maximizes the following pro¯t °ow:
¼t = AtK®
t (ht)1¡® ¡ (1 + ¿f;t)wtht ¡ (rt + ±)Kt (4)
where 0 < ® < 1 and ¿f stands for the payroll taxes. Then, we have max¼ = 0.
2.1.2 The equilibrium and parametrization
Let ¸t be the shadow price of the budget constraint, the optimality conditions of these
problems lead to:




























(1 + ¿f;t)(1 + ¿c;t)
1 ¡ ¿w;t
¾
¾(1 ¡ ht)¡1Ct (9)
, MPHw
t = (1 + TWt) £ MRS(H=C)t
where MPHw
t and MRS(H=C) denote respectively the marginal product of an hour worked
and the marginal rate of substitution between hours worked and consumption. The tax
wedge is de¯ned by:
1 + TWt =
(1 + ¿f;t)(1 + ¿c;t)
1 ¡ ¿w;t
9Following Ohanian, Ra®o, and Rogerson (2006), one can compute the gap between the return
and the cost of the marginal hours worked as follows:
MRS(H=C)t = (1 ¡ ¢
h;w
t )MPHw
t for TW = 0 ) ¢
h;w




In this case, the measure of ¢
h;w
t includes the restriction of full employment (Nt = 1). Hence,
Yt is measured by the aggregate production per capita, Ct by the aggregate consumption
per capita and ht by the average number of hours worked per employee. Finally, in order to
compute the empirical counterpart of ¢
h;w
t , we choose the same parameters of the structural
model than in Ohanian, Ra®o, and Rogerson (2006): ® = :4 and ¾ = 2.
If the labor supply is evaluated without the tax wedge, i.e. if TW = 0, we have, under the
assumption that the model is able to generate the observed data MPHw
t > MRS(H=C)t.
From the point of view of the econometrician, for a given known set of structural parameters,
¢
h;w
t is the residual of the the ¯rst order equation estimated with an omitted variable, the
tax wedge. If this omitted variable has a trend component, the estimation of ¢
h;w
t has also
this trend. Hence, the measure of ¢
h;w
t gives the impact of the tax wedge on the observed
data, under the null assumption that the theory is not rejected. Then, in what follows we
interpret ¢
h;w
t as the wedge between the neo-classical growth model without taxes and data.
In economic terms, this gap provides a measure of the under-utilization of the working time
implied by the disincentive e®ect of taxes. Indeed, when taxes are large, the number of
hours supplied decreases for a given wage. Hence, the larger the taxes, the larger is the gap
between the labor demand (driven by the marginal productivity) and the labor supply as
measured without taxes.
2.1.3 The empirical implications
The time series of ¢
h;w
t are computed for the six countries of our sample. The cross-country
means of the wedges, relative to 1980, are showed in ¯gure 4 (solid line). The ¯rst property
documented by Ohanian, Ra®o, and Rogerson (2006) seems to be veri¯ed: the average wedge
produced by the model without taxes increases at a fairly steady rate from 1960 to the mid
80s, when it levels o®.4
Various factors can explain the labor wedges, including distorting taxation, product mar-
ket regulation, non-competitive wage setting and labor market regulation. The role of taxes
is remarkable from the beginning of the period until the mid 80s. (see ¯gure 5 and table 2).
Then, one may expect that the incorporation of distorting taxation reduces the size of the
4Given the normalization of the wedge to be zero in all countries in 1980, it is only the change in the wedge
that has any signi¯cance. However, we kept this normalization to get series comparable with those of the authors.
10Figure 4: Mean wedges - Walrasian model with intensive margin




















We take 1980 as normalization year. For details on the data see the appendix A.
Figure 5: Hours and Taxes






















hmax, where hmax = 14 ¤ 365 is the maximum number of hours per year to be shared between work and
leisure. ¿w and ¿c are respectively the average tax rates on labor income and consumption. For details on the
taxes see McDaniel (2007).
11Table 2: Correlations with the labor income taxes
Absolute 1960-2003 1960-1980 1980-2003
Aggregate hours (Nh
L ) -0.981 -0.970 -0.558
Hours per employee (h) -0.991 -0.982 -0.885
Employment rate (N
A) -0.905 -0.868 0.185










The dotted line in ¯gure 4 con¯rms our intuition: the size of the gap is reduced over time
and across countries when we consider distorting taxation.
On the other side, the negative impact of the labor market institutions on the performance
of European labor markets after 1980 is well documented. In coherence with the search model
developed in section 3, we conduct a simple statistical analysis to assess the impact of two
institutional factors other than taxes that are typically thought to in°uence the labor market
equilibrium. The strategy is to perform a panel regression to investigate the importance of
taxes, the worker's bargaining power, and the average replacement rate in explaining the
evolution in wedges. The speci¯cation is:
ln(1 ¡ ¢
h;w
i;t;TW=0) = ai + bln(TWi;t ¡ 1) + °Bargi;t + ¯ARRi;t + ²i;t
where ai is a country-speci¯c ¯x e®ect, Bargi;t is the workers' bargaining power, measured
as the average of the union coverage and the union density (see section 3.2), and ARRi;t
is the average replacement rate. The results from the regression (table 3) show that taxes
have a signi¯cant negative impact on the variation in the hours wedge. This result seems
to be robust: for all the speci¯cations (regressions (1) to (4)), the tax wedge has a negative
signi¯cant impact at 5% level. At the opposite, the labor market institutions (LMI) have
not signi¯cant impact on this wedge between theory and data. Regression (5) shows that
the bargaining power, as the sole explanatory variable, has not signi¯cant e®ect. Finally,
regressions (6) and (7) show that the average replacement ratio is correlated with taxes:
in countries where taxes are high and follow an increasing path, the unemployment bene¯t
follows this trend. Hence, if we omit taxes as an explanatory variable, the average replace-
ment ratio has a signi¯cant negative impact on the dynamics of wedge between theory and
data. These results give some support to the view that the increase in taxation is the main
explanative factor of the large decrease in the hours worked in the OECD countries.
12Table 3: Regression results for the hours, 1980-2003
Reg (1) Reg (2) Reg (3) Reg (4) Reg (5) Reg (6) Reg (7)
abe .2055 .0370 .2690 .0047 .0348 .0119 .3177
[-.0860;.4970] [.0013;.0727 ] [-.0016 ; .5397] [ -.0503 ; .0597] [-.3031 ; .3728] [-.0548 ; .0787] [ -.0332 ; .6686]
asp .0773 .0054 .1364 -.0427 .1367 .1518 .3300
[-.1061;.2606] [-.0162;.0271 ] [-.0166 ; .2893] [ -.1088 ; .0234] [-.0576 ; .3310] [ .0958 ; .2078] [ .1216 ; .5384 ]
afr .1383 .0236 .1829 .0002 -.0427 -.0359 .1755
[-.0648;.3415] [-.0160;.0632 ] [-.0054 ; .3713] [ -.0496 ; .0500] [-.2741 ; .1887] [-.0954 ; .0236] [ -.0699 ; .4208]
ait .1510 -.0094 .1834 -.0100 -.0115 -.0904 .1568
[-.0807;.3828] [-.0409;.0220 ] [-.0418 ; .4086] [ -.0413 ; .0213] [-.2927 ; .2697] [-.1201 ;-.0607] [ -.1233 ; .4370]
auk .2237 .1353 .2712 .1032 .2872 .2576 .4376
[.0453;.4021] [ .1115;.1592 ] [ .1123 ; .4300] [ .0552 ; .1512] [ .0854 ; .4890] [ .2213 ; .2939] [ .2316 ; .6435 ]
aus .1045 .0843 .1387 .0519 .2462 .2484 .3239
[.0123;.1967] [.0509;.1178 ] [ .0676 ; .2099] [ -.0018 ; .1056] [ .1607 ; .3317] [ .2187 ; .2780] [ .2339 ; .4140 ]
TW -.3571 -.3209 -.3254 -.3627
[-.4455;-.2687] [-.3909;-.2509] [-.3951 ; -.2557] [ -.4511 ; -.2744]
Barg -.2666 -.3196 -.1921 -.4062
[-.6468;.1135] [-.6891 ; .0500] [-.6604 ; .2762] [ -.8639 ; .0515]
ARR .0949 .1222 -.2785 -.3107
[-.0680;.2577] [ -.0365 ; .2808] [-.4305 ;-.1266] [ -.4658 ; -.1556]
N 144 144 144 144 144 144 144
R
2 .9248 .9222 .9224 .9237 .8764 .8867 .8892
Ordinary least squares regression. \TW" is the tax wedge, \Barg" the bargaining power of the workers and
\ARR" the average replacement rate. The con¯dence intervals (in brackets) are at the 95% level. See details on
the data in the appendix A.
13To sum up, the average hours per employee decrease since 1960. Without taxation, the
wedge between the ¯rst order condition (equation (10)) and the data increases over time.
Before the 80's, this negative correlation between the increasing taxes and the hours per
employee is large and then explains the large increase in the wedge ¢h;w. After the 80's, our
empirical results suggest that the dynamics of taxes is still correlated with ¢h;w, whereas it
is not correlated with the LMI. Then the long-run decline in the hours worked per employee
is mainly due to the increase in the taxes as it is suggested by Prescott (2004), Rogerson
(2006) and Ohanian, Ra®o, and Rogerson (2006).
2.2 When only the extensive margin is endogenous
Given that the employment rate and the average hours worked per employee follow di®erent
paths in some countries, it is interesting to explore the explanative role of taxation along
the extensive margin. To this end, we compute an employment wedge to the equilibrium
condition from the Hansen-Rogerson model. In this type of economy, the number of hours
per employee is indivisible, and then, only the extensive margin can °uctuate.
2.2.1 The Hansen-Rogerson economy
This con¯guration corresponds to the indivisible labor proposed by Hansen (1985) and Roger-
son (1988). At the beginning of each period, the agent plays an employment lottery. If she
wins, with probability Nt, she works h hours. In the opposite case, with probability 1 ¡ Nt,
she does not work at all.
The utility function of the representative household is linear with respect to labor and is
given by:5
Ut = lnCt + Nt¾ ln(1 ¡ h) , Ut = ^ ¾ lnCt + (1 ¡ ^ ¾)(1 ¡ Nt)
Each household chooses fCt;Nt;Kt+1jt ¸ 0g to maximize
1 X
t=0
¯tU(Ct;1 ¡ Nt) (10)
subject to the budget constraint
(1 + Rt)Kt + (1 ¡ ¿w;t)wtNt + Lt + ¼t ¡ Kt+1 ¡ (1 + ¿c;t)Ct ¸ 0 (¸t) (11)
5The utility function is expressed in a simpler way using the ordinal property of utility functions. The trans-
formation implies:







14On the other side, the representative ¯rm chooses fKt;Ntjt ¸ 0g to maximize the discounted
value of the dividend °ow:
max¼ = max
Kt;Nt
fYt ¡ (rt + ±)Kt ¡ (1 + ¿f;t)wtNtg (12)
subject to the technology constraint:
Yt = AtK®
t (Nt)1¡®; 0 < ® < 1 (13)
implying that max¼ = 0.
2.2.2 The equilibrium and parametrization
The optimality conditions of these problems lead to:
¸t = (^ ¾(1 + ¿c;t)Ct)¡1 (14)
wt =




















Therefore, the labor market equilibrium is then determined by:
(1 ¡ ®)
Yt
Nt | {z }
MPNt
= (1 + TWt)
µ







where MPNt and MRSHans(N=C) denote respectively the marginal product of an employee
who works h hours and the marginal rate of substitution between employment and consump-
tion. Note that, contrary to the previous model, equation (18) shows that, for a given wage,
the variations in consumption are orthogonal to those in the employment. In this economy,
the gap between the marginal return and the marginal cost of employment is computed as
follows:
(1 + TWt)MRSHans(N=C)t = (1 ¡ ¢
n;Hans
t )MPNt for TW ¸ 0
) ¢
n;Hans
t = 1 ¡ (1 + TWt)
MRSHans(N=C)t
MPNt
In this case, there is not full employment but the measure of ¢
n;Hans
t includes the restriction
that employees work a ¯xed amount of time. Hence, Yt is measured by the aggregate pro-
duction per capita, Ct by the aggregate consumption per capita, and Nt by the total civilian
employment.
As in the divisible labor model, we choose the same parameters than in Ohanian, Ra®o,
and Rogerson (2006), i.e. ® = :4 and ¾ = 2. Given that the (normalized) average number of
hours worked by employee is equal to h = 0:3563, we deduce that ^ ¾ = 0:5316.
152.2.3 The empirical implications
Proceeding as before, we compute time series for the six countries of our sample. The cross-
country means of the employment wedges, relative to 1980, are shown in ¯gure 6. Contrarily
than for the average hours worked per employee (previous section), the mean employment
wedge, calculated without taxes, display virtually no trend (solid line). This, together with
the results from the employment regressions (Table 4), suggests that taxes have a little
or a not signi¯cant impact on employment. In other words, the correlation between the
trend of the taxes and the cross-country means of employment wedges seems less robust.
Indeed, when we incorporate taxes, the size of the mean wedge largely increases after the
70s, displaying a period of sharp decrease that is persistent in Europe. This suggest that
the explanation of the labor market trend based only on the joint dynamics of hours worked
per employee and taxes, as it is proposed in Prescott (2004), Rogerson (2006) or Ohanian,
Ra®o, and Rogerson (2006), must be completed.
Figure 6: Walrasian model with extensive margin



























We take 1980 as normalization year. For details on the data see the appendix A.
The large literature on the European unemployment experience underlines that, con-
versely to the individual work e®ort, the employment rate is more likely to be a®ected by
the institutional aspects of the labor market rather than by taxes. In order to test the rele-
vance of this hypothesis, we conduct the same simple statistical analysis than for the hours
worked per employee. We measure the in°uence of two institutional factors other than taxes,
namely the bargaining power and the unemployment bene¯ts, that are typically thought to
in°uence the employment rate.
As before, the strategy is to perform panel regressions to investigate the importance
16of taxes, the worker's bargaining power, and the average replacement rate in explaining
the evolution of employment wedges. Indeed, the average replacement rate is the product
between the initial unemployment bene¯t replacement rate (RR1) and the duration of the
unemployment bene¯ts (UBD1). Then, we estimate the model:
ln(1 ¡ ¢
n;Hans
i;t;TW=0) = ai + bln(TWi;t ¡ 1) + °Bargi;t + ¯RR1i;t + ±UBD1i;t + ²i;t
Results are presented in table 4. We observe that the e®ect of taxes is not signi¯cant
Table 4: Regression results for the employment, 1980-2003
Reg (1) Reg (2) Reg (3) Reg (4) Reg (5) Reg (6) Reg (7)
abe -0.4583 -1.2336 -.7994 -1.184 -.7722 -1.173 -.5567
[-.8418;-.0748] [-1.282;-1.184] [-1.151;-.4479] [-1.250;-1.118] [-1.120;-.4234] [-1.239;-1.107] [-.9457;-.1676]
asp -0.7522 -1.3145 -1.065 -1.215 -1.071 -1.274 -.9005
[-1.008;-.4962] [-1.339;-1.289] [-1.266;-.8638] [-1.305;-1.125] [-1.272;-.8700] [-1.345;-1.202] [-1.143;-.6578]
afr -0.6809 -1.2328 -.9380 -1.183 -.9084 -1.162 -.7313
[-.9509;-.4108] [-1.286;-1.178] [-1.180;-.6956] [-1.252;-1.115] [-1.145;-.6712] [-1.228;-1.096] [-1.007;-.4554]
ait -0.6528 -1.2554 -.8970 -1.237 -.8738 -1.217 -.7179
[-.9607;-.3450] [-1.298;-1.212] [-1.187;-.6065] [-1.284;-1.189] [-1.161;-.5857] [-1.261;-1.173] [-1.031;-.4041]
auk -0.4298 -0.9498 -.6955 -.8817 -.7063 -.9444 -.5812
[-.6770;-.1825] [-.9799;-.9196] [-.9016;-.4895] [-.9607;-.8028] [-.9118;-.5008] [-.9973;-.8915] [-.8130;-.3495]
aus -0.5013 -0.7875 -.6838 -.7154 -.7049 -.7894 -.6307
[-.6368;-.3659] [-.8312;-.7439] [-.7774;-.5903] [-.7962;-.6345] [-.7912;-.6186] [-.8305;-.7484] [-.7372;-.5243]
TW 0.1670 0.0559 .0546 .1234
[.0540; .2801 ] [-.0403; .1522] [-.0397; .1490] [.0067; .2400 ]
Barg -0.9605 -.6021 -.6051 -.8116
[-1.461;-.4598] [-1.085;-.1192] [-1.088;-.1217] [-1.316;-.3064]
RR1 -0.1704 -.1033 -.0662 -.1118
[-.2682;-.0726] [-.1995;-.0072] [-.1570; .0245] [-.2039;-.0197]
UBD1 -0.0619 -.0362 -.0036 -.0155
[-.1212;-.0026] [-.0970; .0246] [-.0567; .0495] [-.0673; .0363]
N 144 144 144 144 144 144 144
R
2 .9329 .9268 .9310 .9275 .9310 .9269 .9320
Ordinary least squares regression. \TW" is the tax wedge, \Barg" the bargaining power of the workers, \RR1"
the initial unemployment bene¯t replacement rate, and \UBD1" the unemployment bene¯t duration (years).
The con¯dence intervals (in brackets) are at the 95% level. See details on the data in the appendix A.
when the tax wedge is the only regressor (regression (2)); or when only the bargaining
power is included (regression (3)). However, taxes become signi¯cant in combination with
17the RR1 and the UDB1 (regressions (1) and (4)). In contrast with the results obtained
for individual hours, taxes have a negative e®ect on the employment wedge (equivalently, a
positive e®ect on log(1 ¡ ¢
n;Hans
i;t;TW=0)): the observed increase in taxes induces a downward
trend in the estimated gap between the theory and the data. Then, as is suggested by ¯gure
6, the persistent decrease in the employment rate not explained by the walrasian model µ a la
Hansen-Rogerson is not due to a shift in taxes.
What about the labor market indicators? The results from this set of regressions show
that the negative e®ect of the workers' bargaining power is robust: it remains negative and
signi¯cant in all regressions. Finally, concerning the unemployment bene¯ts, we notice that
the initial replacement rate (RR1) has a signi¯cant negative e®ect on the employment wedges.
This e®ect seems quite robust, even if, when no other regressor is included (regression (6)),
it is signi¯cant only at the 20% level. At the opposite, the impact of the duration of the
unemployment bene¯ts (UBD1) is not robust: in the complete regression (regression (1)),
its impact is negative and signi¯cant, whereas in the other regressions, it is not signi¯cant.
These statistical results support the view that the labor market institution shifts explain
the wedge between theory and data when data.
To sum up, the employment rate is decreasing until the early 1980s. Then it remains
stable in France and Italy, whereas in the other countries it shows a slight (Belgium and
Spain) to moderate increasing trend (US and UK). Without taxation, the wedge between
the ¯rst order condition and data displays virtually no signi¯cant trend. Finally, this wedge
is negatively correlated with both the workers' bargaining power and the unemployment
bene¯ts, in particular with the initial replacement rate (RR1). Moreover, the tax wedge is
not correlated with the gap between the theoretical model and the data (¢n;Hans).
Since 1980, a notable feature of the data is that di®erences across countries in aggregate
hours are due to quantitatively important di®erences along the extensive margin and the
intensive margin. Then, it seems relevant to analyze the labor market dynamics taking into
account these two margins. Moreover, in this alternative quantitative model, the introduction
of the labor market institutions is expected to reduce the gap between the marginal cost and
the marginal return of labor. This is done in the search economy developed in next section.
3 Search model with intensive and extensive margins
In this section we propose a theoretical framework allowing to explain simultaneously the
dynamics of the employment and the hours worked per employee. We also need for a theory
explaining the impact of the labor market institutions such as the bargaining power and
the unemployment bene¯ts. The natural candidate is then the matching model, where both
18employment and hours are endogenous. With this type of model, we are able to quantify the
relative importance of taxes and of labor market institutions in the total hours dynamics.
More precisely, we expect that our model is able to explain that the dynamics of the hours
worked per employee is mainly accounted by the taxes, whereas the employment dynamics
is driven by the labor market institutions.
3.1 The equilibrium matching model
We present in this section a neo-classical growth model where the labor market equilibrium
is determined by a search process and a wage bargaining process. This model is close to the
one analyzed by Andolfatto (1996), Fµ eve and Langot (1996) and Ch¶ eron and Langot (2004).
3.1.1 Labor market °ows
Employment is predetermined at each time and changes only gradually as workers separate
from jobs, at the exogenous rate s, or unemployed agents ¯nd jobs, at the hiring rate Mt.
Let Nt and Vt, respectively be the number of workers and the total number of new jobs made
available by ¯rms, then employment evolves according to
Nt+1 = (1 ¡ s)Nt + Mt
with Mt = V
Ã
t (1 ¡ Nt)1¡Ã; 0 < Ã < 1.
3.1.2 Households
The economy is populated by a large number of identical households whose measure is
normalized to one. Each household consists of a continuum of in¯nitely-lived agents. At any
period, an agent can engage in only one of two activities: working or searching for a job.
Employed agents (N) work h hours, while unemployed (1¡N) expend their time searching a
job. Unemployed agents are randomly matched with job vacancies. Individual idiosyncratic
risks faced by each agent in his job match are smoothed by using employment lotteries.






t ;1 ¡ ht) + (1 ¡ Nt)U(Cu
t )] (19)
where 0 < ¯ < 1 is the discount factor and ­H
t = fKt;Nt;ªt;wt;ht;bt;¼t;Rt;Ltg, 8t. Cn
t
and Cu
t stand for the consumption of employed and unemployed agents. The contemporane-
ous utility function is assumed to be increasing and concave in both arguments and it shows





t; z = n;u:
19where ¡n
t = ¾ log(1 ¡ ht), with ¾ > 0, and ¡u
t = ¡u = 0, 8 t.
A household's employment opportunities evolve as follows:
Nt+1 = (1 ¡ s)Nt + ªt(1 ¡ Nt) (20)
ª ´ Mt=(1 ¡ Nt) is the rate at which unemployed agents ¯nd jobs.
The capital stock Kt is rented to ¯rms at net price (rt + ±), where 0 < ± < 1 is the
depreciation rate of capital. Each household chooses fCn
t ;Cu
t ;Kt+1jt ¸ 0g to maximize (19)
subject to the labor supply constraint (20) and to the budget constraint
Kt+1 = ¡(1 + ¿c;t)[NtCn
t + (1 ¡ Nt)Cu
t ]
+[1 + (1 ¡ ¿k;t)rt]Kt + (1 ¡ ¿w;t)[Ntwtht + (1 ¡ Nt)bt] + Lt + ¼t (21)
where b are the unemployment bene¯ts. Then, the ¯rst order conditions with respect to
consumption and capital are respectively,
(Cn
t )¡1 = (Cu
t )¡1 ´ (Ct)¡1 = (1 + ¿c;t)¸t (22)
¯[(1 + Rt+1)¸t+1] = ¸t (23)
3.1.3 Firms
There are many identical ¯rms in the economy. Each ¯rm chooses a number Vt of job
vacancies, produces goods and pays wages and capital services. The unit cost of maintaining
an open vacancy is !. Each ¯rm has access to a Cobb-Douglas production technology to
produce output:
Yt = AtK®
t (Ntht)1¡®; 0 < ® < 1 (24)
Job vacancies are matched at the constant rate ©t = Mt=Vt. Hence, a ¯rm's labor employ-
ment evolves as
Nt+1 = (1 ¡ s)Nt + ©tVt (25)
Each ¯rm chooses fNt+1;Kt;Vtjt ¸ 0g to maximize the discounted value of the dividend
°ow, subject to the constraint (24), and to the labor constraint (25):
W(­F









¼t = Yt ¡ (rt + ±)Kt ¡ !tVt ¡ (1 + ¿f;t)wtNth (26)
with ­F
t = fNt;©t;wt;ht;rtg and initial condition N0. ¿f stands for the payroll tax payed








































value for a match for a worker. ²t denotes the ¯rm's bargaining power at date t. In coherence
with our empirical measure of the worker's bargaining power (left panel of ¯gure 7), this
parameter varies over time and across countries.
The solution to this problem are the hours and wage contracts6. With an e±cient bar-
gaining over hours, the optimal choice of hours worked by employee is closed to the walrasian
case. However, the wage contract takes into account the dynamic behavior of taxes and the
unemployment bene¯ts.
3.1.5 The Equilibrium
Given the vector of taxes, unemployment bene¯ts and bargaining powers f¿c;t;¿f;t;¿w;t;bt;²tg,
the general equilibrium is de¯ned by the set of functions fCt;Vt;Kt+1;Nt+1;wt;ht;Lt;Mt;Ytg1
t=0,
solution of the system formed by the optimality conditions, the equation of the employment
dynamics and the condition for the equilibrium on the goods markets. Let de¯ne the market




1¡¿w;t, and the relative bargaining power: Ât ´ 1¡²t
²t . Then the system de¯ning the
equilibrium is:
Nt+1 = (1 ¡ s)Nt + Mt (30)
Mt = µ
Ã
t (1 ¡ Nt) (31)
Yt = Kt+1 ¡ (1 ¡ ±)Kt + Ct + !Vt (32)


























+ (1 ¡ s)
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©t+1
¡ (1 + ¿f;t+1)wt+1ht+1
¶¸
(36)
((1 + ¿c;t)Ct)¡1 = ¸t (37)


















































+ (1 ¡ ¿w;t)bt
¾
Finally, the unemployment bene¯ts are computed as the product of the average replace-
ment rate (½t) and the hourly wage: bt = ½twtht. The last equation can be rewritten as
follows:


































(1 + TWt)(¡u ¡ ¡n
t )Ct
In the matching model, both the number of employees and the number of hours worked
are endogenous. After the wage bargaining process, the right to manage assumption leads
the ¯rms to hire a number of workers given a bargained labor cost per employee ((1 +
¿f;t)wtht). Because we assume an e±cient bargaining process, the equilibrium number of
hours is determined by the same equation than in a walrasian economy (endogenous intensive
margin). Then the labor market equilibrium conditions are:
(1 + ¿f;t)wtht | {z }
MCN
= (1 ¡ ²t)
8
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(1 + ¿f;t)wtht | {z }
MRN
= (1 ¡ ®)
Yt
























¾(1 ¡ ht)¡1Ct | {z }
MRS(H/C)
where MRN denotes the marginal return of an employee and MCN her marginal cost.
Similarly, MRS(N=C) denotes the marginal rate of substitution between employment and
consumption whereas MPH stands for the marginal product of an hour worked. The previ-
22ous system can be rewritten as:
MRNt = MCNt
MPHt = (1 + TWt) £ MRS(H=C)t
One can remark that the MCN has now two components: the bargained surplus and the
reservation wage. Whereas the reservation wage is only a®ected by the tax/bene¯t system
(tax wedge and unemployment bene¯ts), the bargained surplus is also a®ected by the labor
market frictions through the search cost.
Without taxes and without labor market institutions, i.e. TW = 1 ¡ ² = UB = 0, the
marginal cost of employment MCN is given by the marginal rate of substitution between
employment and consumption MRS(N=C), as in the Hansen-Rogerson economy. Relatively
to this walrasian model, the labor market institutions lead to an increase in the MCN,
through the introduction of both an additional value of leisure (the unemployment bene¯ts
UB > 0) and a bargained surplus (1 ¡ ² > 0). Hence, the shift across time of the labor
market institutions can explain the dynamics of the employment by decreasing the wedge
between the data and the theory. Finally, the increase in the tax wedge TW raises also the
marginal cost of employment through the reservation wage. Via this last channel, one can
also expect to reduce the gap between data and theory.
Following Ohanian, Ra®o and Rogerson (2006), we compute the gap between the return
and the cost of the marginal employee as follows:
MCNt = (1 ¡ ¢n
t )MRNt for TW ¸ 0; UB ¸ 0 ) ¢n
t = 1 ¡
MCNt
MRNt
Relatively to the Hansen-Rogerson's economy, the matching model leads to new evaluations
of both the marginal return of employment (MRN) and the marginal cost of employment
(MCN). The smaller the labor market frictions, the smaller is the gap between the Hansen-
Rogerson economy and our matching model.
The condition allowing to generate the number of hours worked in the non-walrasian
economy is the same than in the walrasian one, except that in the previous case the employ-
ment rate is not restricted to be equal to one. This expression does not introduce any labor
market friction because we assume an e±cient bargaining process over the hours worked.
Then we have:
(1+TWt)MRS(H=C)t = (1¡¢h




Contrary to the walrasian case, we do not impose Nt = 1 (full-employment). The measure
of ¢h
t is computed using the aggregate production per capita Yt, the aggregate consumption
per capita Ct, the number of hours worked by employee ht and the employment rate Nt.
233.2 Calibration and data
The aim of the empirical part is to measure the contribution of both the labor market
indicators (LMI) and the taxes speci¯c of each country. Taxes and LMI were not constant
over the last two decades (see ¯gure 7 and ¯gure 9). Then, the dynamics of the gap between
the marginal cost of employment and its marginal return is a®ected by changes in either the
LMI and the taxes. In order to measure the impact of the tax/bene¯t system we construct
the di®erent hours and employment wedges under several con¯gurations, using the data
described in appendix A.
These measures are evaluated using the following parametrization of the structural pa-
rameters. We choose ® = 0:4 and ¾ = 2 as in (Ohanian, Ra®o, and Rogerson 2006). The
discount parameter is such that ¯ = 0:985. The elasticity of the matching function with
respect to vacancies is equal to Ã = 0:6 (Blanchard and Diamond 1992). We assume a ratio
of aggregate recruiting expenditures to output (!tVt=Yt) equal 1% (Andolfatto 1996). We set
! equal to the mean over time and countries. Finally, in order to make an easy comparison
of the model with and without unemployment, we assume that an unemployed worker enjoys
all her leisure time, which means that the search activity has no disutility cost.
The labor market indicators give the dynamics of the bargaining power of workers and
the unemployment bene¯ts (the replacement ratio) in each country. We have two statistical
indicators which allow us to measure the bargaining power of the employee during the wage
bargaining process: the union coverage and the union density. These two indicators are not
directly the bargaining power, but are closely linked to it: a large union coverage or a high
union density imply that the probability for the employee to be alone during the bargaining
process is very low. Hence, the bargaining power is higher in an economy where the ¯rm
does not have a monopsony power. We choose to evaluate 1 ¡ ² by the average of the union
coverage and the union density. The dynamics of the LMI are represented in ¯gure 7.
We also take into account the heterogeneity in the separation rate, but this parameter
is constant over the time in order to be consistent with our theoretical framework. We
calibrate the job destruction rates in order to reproduce the average unemployment duration
for the 1985-1994 period estimated by Blanchard and Portugal (2001) (see appendix A). The
average unemployment durations and the corresponding destruction rates are summarized
in table 5, whereas the evolution of the expected unemployment duration across countries
is displayed in ¯gure 8. Notice that in Spain and Italy the unemployment duration shows a
large peak (144 months for Spain and 208 for Italy) that corresponds to the economic crisis
experienced in the early 90s.
Finally, ¯gure 9 shows the dynamics in each country of the several taxes that de¯ne
our tax wedge (TW): the payroll tax (¿f), the tax on labor income (¿w) and the tax on
24Figure 7: Bargaining power and replacement rate







































Table 5: Unemployment duration and the job destruction rate.
Country Belgium Spain France Italy United Kingdom United States
1
ª
¤ (months) 23 41 20 30 10 2.5
s (%) 5.95 6.15 6.10 5.75 10.40 30.48
¤: Source: Blanchard and Portugal (2001). The authors construct monthly °ows into unemployment
as the average number of workers unemployed for less than one month, for the period 1985-1994,
divided by the average labor force during the same period. The source of these data is the OECD
duration database. Unemployment duration is constructed as the ratio of the average unemployment
rate for the period 1985-1994 to the °ow into unemployment.
25Figure 8: Unemployment duration























































































consumption (¿c). These ¯gures clearly show that there are two groups of countries: the
¯rst, with Belgium, France and Italy, where the tax wedge is high and the second, with
Spain, the UK and the US, where the tax wedge is low. Figures show that these two groups
of countries are the same if we focus on the labor tax or on the payroll tax. At the opposite,
the consumption tax does not support this separation into two groups of countries.
3.3 Empirical results
In order to evaluate the impact of each deviation from the two neo-classical growth models
presented in sections 2.1 and 2.2, we propose the following decomposition. First, we introduce
only search costs in the measure of the marginal return of employment. Hence, in this ¯rst
step (and as long as taxation is null), our theory on hours worked by employee is the same
than in the neo-classical growth model with divisible hours, whereas the deviation between
our theory on employment allocation and the Hansen-Rogerson' one comes from the country-
speci¯c dynamics of the labor market tightness. In a second step, our objective is to measure
the impact of country-speci¯c labor market institutions, to know: the separation rate, the
bargaining power and the unemployment bene¯ts. Once again, this does not change our
theory on the hours worked allocation, but modi¯es both the marginal return of employment
and the marginal cost of employment. Next, we introduce country-speci¯c dynamics of taxes,
which change the allocation of both hours worked per employee and employment. This allows
us to measure the relative impact of taxes. Finally, in order to asses the global impact of
the tax/bene¯t systems, we consider simultaneously both sources of heterogeneity: the labor
26Figure 9: Taxes











































market institutions and taxation.
3.3.1 A world with search costs
Beyond the introduction of the labor market institutions such as bargaining and unemploy-
ment bene¯ts, the matching model introduces search costs. The higher the unemployment
rate, the higher is the probability to ¯nd a worker for a ¯rm. Hence, in economies with high
unemployment, search costs paid by ¯rms are low. In order to evaluate the magnitude of the
search costs, we set TW = UB = 0, 1 ¡ ² = 0 and ! > 0. Because our simple model does
not introduce endogenous job separation, we only introduce a constant heterogeneity in the
separation rate: s = Ei[si], where i denotes the country. Then we have:
MCNi;t = RWi;t = MRS(N=C)i;t
MRNt = (1 ¡ ®)
Yi;t
Ni;t









i;t = 1 ¡
MCNi;t
MRNi;t
These expressions explain why we get closer results than in the Hansen-Rogerson econ-
omy (see the appendix B where we report the results by country for the Hansen-Rogeson
economy). The intuition is that agents face a similar employment lottery in both cases.
Then, the MCN is the same in the two types of economy. However, in the search economy
27of ¯gure 10 the gap is lower because we take into account that search is a costly process. This
is measured though an evaluation of the marginal rate of return of an employee (MRN). In
the US or in the UK, where the unemployment rate is signi¯cantly smaller, the search cost
is higher for ¯rms and then, the value of an employee is relatively higher than in the others
countries. We observe the same phenomena for Spain at the end the sample period, where
this country experienced a large decline of unemployment.
Figure 10: Employment in the model with search costs.

















On the other side, the condition generating the number of hours worked in the non-
walrasian economy (¯gure 11) is the same than in the walrasian one, except that in the
former the employment rate is not restricted to be equal to one. This expression does not
introduce any labor market friction because we assume an e±cient bargaining process over
the hours worked. As discussed before, the evaluation of this model without taxes enlarges
the gap between the marginal productivity of labor and its marginal cost.
3.3.2 A world with country-speci¯c institutions
Is our theory able to explain the role of labor market institutions on the employment dy-
namics? In order to give a quantitative answer to this question, we introduce the country
speci¯c labor market indicators. Hence, in this con¯guration we set TWi;t = 0, 1 ¡ ²i;t > 0,
UBi;t > 0, si > 0 and ! > 0. This model allows us to evaluate the impact of the het-
erogeneity across countries of labor market institutions. As in the empirical literature (see
e.g. Bassanini and Duval (2006)), we also take into account the country-speci¯c dynamics
of these labor market indicators (bargaining power and unemployment bene¯ts). Then we
28Figure 11: Hours in the model with search costs


















RWi;t = MRS(N=C)i;t + UBi;t




MCNi;t = (1 ¡ ²i;t)BSi;t + ²i;tRWi;t
MRNi;t = (1 ¡ ®)
Yi;t
Ni;t









i;t = 1 ¡
MCNi;t
MRNi;t
Since we do not introduce taxation, the heterogeneity comes only from the aggregates
and from the labor market institutions. Results are reported in ¯gure 12. The e®ect of the
country-speci¯c labor market indicators (worker's bargaining power, unemployment bene¯ts
and separation rates) is striking. Nevertheless, the results for the US economy are di®erent
from those for the European countries. Indeed, in the US, the observed labor market indi-
cators are the lowest. Then, they have the smallest impact on the employment dynamics.
At the opposite, when the labor indicators point to the existence of high real rigidities, the
introduction of such variables in the theoretical model largely improves its ¯t. This is true
for all European countries, included the UK. Indeed the labor market reforms in this last
country have only a gradual impact on the employment dynamics after the 80s.
This experience clearly shows that in all countries, the gaps are largely damped when we
take into account the country-speci¯c heterogeneity of the labor market indicators. This gives
some empirical support to our theoretical approach: a matching model with wage bargain-
ing accounts quite well for the employment dynamics if we introduce country-speci¯c labor
29Figure 12: Employment with country-speci¯c institutions (Taxes = 0)

















market indicators. On the other hand, this experience gives also a theoretical foundation for
our regression results presented in table 4.
3.3.3 A world with country-speci¯c taxation
Which is the relative weight of taxes on the observed employment dynamics? In order to give
a quantitative answer to this question, we set the labor market indicators to zero and we allow
for positive taxation (TWi;t > 0). In this case, workers have not bargaining power (1¡²i;t =
0) and, given that the unemployment bene¯ts are equal to zero (½i;t = 0), the reservation
wage is just the marginal rate of substitution between employment and consumption, net
of taxes. Finally, if the search is a costless process (! = 0), there are not intertemporal
returns from labor. This con¯guration allows us to asses both the impact of the di®erent tax
systems across countries, and the relative weight of taxes with respect to the labor market
institutions in shaping the employment behavior. Then we have:
MCNi;t = (1 + TWi;t)MRS(N=C)i;t
MRNi;t = (1 ¡ ®)
Yi;t
Ni;t
Results are shown in ¯gure 13. The di®erence between this economy and the Hansen-
Rogerson's one, is that the number of hours worked per employees varies over time and
across countries. Then, the measure of the reservation wage in this economy is coherent with
the other evaluations of the matching model. By comparing this simulation and the results
reported in appendix B, we measure the impact of the observed time-varying heterogeneity in
hours worked on the extensive margin. For countries where the number of hours worked per
employee is higher than the average of the sample (the calibration retained for the Hansen-
30Figure 13: Employment with country-speci¯c taxation (LMI = 0)



















Rogerson economy), the reservation wage with °exible hours is bigger than its measure in the
Hansen-Rogerson economy. Then, by taking into account the time-varying hours worked,
we reduce the gap between theory and data for these countries (e.g. US and UK). The
opposait is true for countries where the number of hours worked per employee is lower than
the average.
By comparing the ¯gures 13 and 12, we deduce that even if the e®ect of taxes is not
negligible, the wedges still larger than in economy where only the heterogeneity of labor
market institutions is taking into account.
3.3.4 A world with country-speci¯c taxation and institutions
Finally, in this con¯guration we allow for both taxation and labor market institutions. That
is, we set TWi;t > 0, 1¡²i;t > 0, UBi;t > 0, si > 0 and ! > 0. The corresponding gap gives
a measure of the under-utilization of employment implied by the tax/bene¯t system. Results
are shown in ¯gure 14. The improvement with respect to the two previous economies is in
part due to the fact that, without taxes, the real wage is underestimated.
These results, concerning the relative contribution of taxes and labor market institution
in the explanation of the employment dynamics, are well captured in ¯gure 15. This ¯gure
shows the cross-country averages of the employment wedge for the various scenarios. In the
top left panel we can asses the weight of unemployment. The gaps produced by the walrasian
economy are very close to those produced by the search economy because the search costs
are relatively small. The top right panel shows the marginal contribution of the labor market
institutions whereas the bottom left panel shows the marginal contribution of taxes. Whereas
the labor market institutions allow to divide the mean gap by 3, taxes allow to divide the
31Figure 14: Employment with country-speci¯c taxation and institutions


















mean gap by 2. The comparison of these two extreme cases enhances the preponderant role of
the labor market institutions as determinant of the observed employment behavior. Finally,
the bottom right panel shows the average wedges produced by our model when we integrate
both sources of cross-country heterogeneity: taxation and labor market institutions. In this
case the (average) gap between the model and data is largely damped and very close to zero.
Figure 15: Cross-country mean wedges (Employment)







































































Finally, as expected, the gap between the theory and the data concerning the individual
work e®ort diminishes because this setting captures the disincentive e®ect of taxes (¯gure
16).
¢h
t = 1 ¡ (1 + TWt)
MRS(H=C)t
MPHt
32Figure 16: Hours with country-speci¯c taxation and institutions


















Aggregate hours of market work exhibit dramatic di®erences across industrialized countries.
On the one hand, di®erences are large between Europe and the US. On the other hand,
we observe large di®erences even among European countries. Moreover, since 1980 a no-
table feature of the data is that di®erences across countries in aggregate hours are due to
quantitatively important di®erences along the extensive margin and the intensive margin.
The existing literature suggests that the main factors explaining the decline in the hours
worked per employee di®er from those explaining the decline in the employment rate: in
the former case taxes play a prominent role (Prescott (2004), Rogerson (2006) and Ohanian,
Ra®o, and Rogerson (2006)), whereas labor market institutions, such as unions or unem-
ployment bene¯ts, explain the downturn in employment rates (Layard and Nickell (1991),
Mortensen and Pissarides (1999), Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) or Ljungqvist and Sargent
(2007)). In this paper, we show that all together contribute to the dynamics of the two
margins of the total hours. We develop a model that includes the intensive and the extensive
margins. The behavior of the two margins composing the aggregate hours is well accounted
by our search model when it includes the observed heterogeneity across countries of both
taxes and the labor market indicators (unemployment bene¯ts and the bargaining power).
Relative to the walrasian economies, the general equilibrium matching model leads to
new evaluations of both the marginal return of employment (MRN) and the marginal cost
of employment (MCN). The labor market institutions lead to an increase in the MCN,
through the introduction of both an additional value of leisure (the unemployment bene¯ts)
and a bargained surplus. Hence, we show that the shift across time of the labor market in-
33stitutions explains approximately 2/3 of the dynamics of the employment rate. The increase
of the tax wedge raises also the marginal cost of employment through the reservation wage.
Through this channel, taxes explain about 1/3 of the employment rate dynamics. Finally,
we show that we need only taxes for accounting for the observed shift in the average hours
worked per employee.
In addition, our quantitative experiences put in evidence that the US economy is closer to
the walrasian model than the European economies, because frictions on the labor market are
smaller. Finally, our results suggest than in all cases, the matching model performs better
in the labor market accounting exercise.
References
Andolfatto, D. (1996): \Business cycle and labor market search," American Economic
Review, 86(1), 112{132.
Bassanini, A., and R. Duval (2006): \Employment Patterns in OECD Countries: Re-
assesing the Role of Policies and Institutions," OECD Social, Employment and Migration
Working Papers, 4(35).
Blanchard, O., and P. Diamond (1992): \The Flow Approach to Labor Markets,"
American Economic Review, 82(2), 501{515.
Blanchard, O., and P. Portugal (2001): \What Hides behind an Unemployment Rate:
Comparing Portuguese and U.S. Labor Markets," American Economic Review, 91(1),
187{207.
Blanchard, O., and J. Wolfers (2000): \The role of shocks and institutions in the rise
of european unemployment: the aggregate evidence," Economic Journal, 110, 1{33.
Ch¶ eron, A., and F. Langot (2004): \Labor market search and real business cycles:
reconciling Nash bargaining with the real wage dynamics," Review of Economic Dynamics,
7, 476{493.
Daveri, F., and G. Tabellini (2000): \Unemployment, growth and taxation in industrial
countries," Economic Policy, 15(30), 47{104.
Fµ eve, P., and F. Langot (1996): \Unemployment and business cycle in a small open
economy: GMM estimation and testing on French data," Journal of Economic Dynamics
and Control, (20).
Hansen, G. (1985): \Indivisible Labor and the Business Cycles," Journal of Monetary
Economics, 16, 309{327.
34Layard, R., and N. Nickell, S. ad Jackman (1991): \Unemployment, Macroeconomic
Performance and the Labour Market," Oxford University Press.
Ljungqvist, L., and T. Sargent (2007): \Two Questions about European Unemploy-
ment," Forthcoming Econometrica.
McDaniel, C. (2007): \Average tax rates on consumption, investment, labor and capital
in the OECD 1950-2003," Arizona State University, mimeo.
Mendoza, E., A. Razzin, and L. Tessar (1994): \E®ective tax rates in macroeconomics:
Cross-country estimates of tax rates on factor incomes and consumption," Journal of
Monetary Economics, (34), 297{323.
Mortensen, D. T., and C. A. Pissarides (1999): \Unemployment Responses to 'Skill-
Biased' Technology Shocks: The Role of Labour Market Policy," Economic Journal,
109(455), 242{265.
Ohanian, L., A. Raffo, and R. Rogerson (2006): \Long-term changes in labor supply
and taxes: evidence from OECD countries, 1956-2004," NBER Working Paper Series,
(12786).
Prescott, E. (2004): \Why do Americans work so much more than Europeans?," Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, 28(1), 2{13.
Rogerson, R. (1988): \Indivisible labor, lotteries and equilibrium," Journal of Monetary
Economics, 22(3), 501{515.
(2006): \Understanding di®erences in hours worked," Review of Economic Dynam-
ics, (9), 365{409.
A Data
The sample is composed by Belgium, Spain, France, Italy, United Kingdom, United States.
Depending on the availability of data, the analysis covers the 1980-2003 or the 1960-2003
period. Data on consumption, gross domestic product (GDP), employment, unemployment,
population, wages and salaries, compensation of employees, the de°ator of consumption and
the defator of GDP (base year 2000) are from the OECD.7
Series for hours worked are from the Groningen Growth and Development Centre and the
Conference Board,8 whereas the mesures of institutional variables are taken from the Bas-
sanini and Duval (2006) database. The Bassanini et.al.'s collection of labor market variables
covers a large period (1970-2003 or 1982-2003) and mostly rely on indicators provided by the
7OECD Statistics, beta 1.0: http://stats.oecd.org/wbos/default.aspx
8Total Economy Database, January 2007: http://www.ggdc.net
35OECD.9 Finally, we take the series of the average tax rates on labor, capital and consump-
tion from the McDaniel (2007)'s dataset, which covers 15 OECD countries for the period
1950-2003.10 The payroll tax is deduced from the ratio of the compensation of employees to
the wage and salaries. Both mesures are taken from the OECD.
Job destruction. For each country i, the average rate of job destruction si is com-
puted such that the expected duration of unemployment (Et[1=ªt]) is equal to the mean
unemployment duration reported in table 5.
Job destruction in period t (di;t) is de¯ned as the sum of all net employment losses at
establishments experiencing negative net employment gains between t ¡ 1 and t. Given the
job destruction rate si and actual data for employment, we compute the job destruction
series as:
di;t = siNi;t¡1
The Job creation series are obtained from equation (30):
Mi;t = Ni;t ¡ Ni;t¡1 + di;t
that is, the job creation in period t is the sum of all net employment gains between t¡1 and
t. According with our model we compute series for the rate at which workers are matched




where U is the observed unemployment level. Then, using the de¯nition of the matching
function we derive the market tightness (µ) and the rate at which vacancies are matched








B The Hansen-Rorgerson economy by country
9The OECD Secretariat has constructed several indicators of policies and institutions that are comparable
both across countries and over time. These indicators have been used in a wide range of macro-econometric
studies to explore the labor market e®ects of policies and institutions.
10The McDaniel's tax estimates uses national account statistics as primary source and are in line with existing
average tax rates calculated by Mendoza, Razzin, and Tessar (1994). In addition, these are the data used by
Ohanian et.al. (2006).
36Figure 17: Hansen-Rogerson model (TW = 0), 1980-2003

















Figure 18: Hansen-Rogerson model (TW > 0), 1980-2003
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